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FCS: At The Crossroad, Again
The Farm Credit System (FCS) is at yet another
critical juncture. The System faced an earlier cri-
sis in the fall of 1985, when public disclosure of
grave financialproblems raised concern over the
riskiness of the debt issued by this key agri-
cultural lender. (See Weekly Letter, Dec. 20,
1985.) This concern was not eased until the pas-
sage of the 1985 Farm Bill, which provided for
Congressional consideration of direct federal aid
to the FCS.
Today, the sense of urgency surrounding the FCS
"crisis" stems mostly from a desire to protect the
System's member/borrowers. The FCS already
has taken a number of steps to protect member
capital. Many of these steps were made possible
by legislative changes. This year, the Farm
Credit Administration (FCA), the federal regula-
tor of the FCS, is seeking further federal legisla-
tive assistance. Most prominent among the
measures sought by the FCA is a line of credit
from the Treasury to the Farm Credit System.
In this Letter, we discuss whether a line of credit
with the Treasury, as well as some other steps
already taken by the FCS, addresses the funda-
mental problems plaguing the FCS.
The FCS
The Farm Credit System is a cooperatively
owned organization of banks and associations
that provides credit and related services to
farmers and agricultural cooperatives. The Sys-
tem holds about one-fourth oftotal farm debt in
the U.S. and is organized into 12 districts. Each
district has three bank groups serving different
purposes. The Federal Land Bank in a district
makes long-term real estate and equipment
loans to producers through the local Federal
Land Bank Associations. The Federal Intermedi-
ate Credit Bank primarily makes funds available
to the local Production Credit Associations to
finance demand for short-term production loans.
The 13 Banks for Cooperatives, including one
Central Bank for Cooperatives, are sources of
funds for agricultural and rural cooperatives. The
loans extended by the FCS generally have float-
ing rates, so the effective maturities of most of
the System's loans are relatively short.
The FCS obtains most of its funds by selling its
own securities in the federal agency market. The
System's status as a federally sponsored agency
offers it certain advantages, the major one being
the market's perception of an implicit federal
guarantee of agency debt. For the FCS, this per-
ception was bolstered by the 1985 Farm Bill,
which provides the groundwork for opening a
Treasury line of credit to the FCS.
As a cooperative, the FCS obtains capital from
its members. Farmers borrowing from the System
are required to purchase capital. When the loan
is repaid, the borrower can redeem his capital at
book value or par value, whichever is less.
Sources of the problem
The depressed condition of the agricultural
economy has affected all farm lenders, including
the FCS. The effects of the poor quality of FCS
assets are evident in net charge-offs of $2.9 bil-
lion and the $2.1 billion increase in loan loss
reserves since 1984. As the chart shows, heavy
losses for the FCS have depleted most of the Sys-
tem's surplus capital (earned surplus), leaving
only a small buffer against member capital.
The threat to member capital compounds the
FCS problems by effectively reducing the com-
petitiveness of the FCS relative to the other
major agricultural lenders/such as commercial
banks and life insurance companies. As the
book-value of member capital has fallen relative
to its par or face value, those members of the
FCS with higher credit ratings, and therefore bet-
ter access to other borrowing sources, have the
incentive to withdraw from the System. More-
over, as some members withdraw their capital
the greater possible losses for the remaining
members, as well as for borrowers taking out
new loans with the FCS, could make the true
cost of borrowing higher than the stated interest
rate on an FCS loan.
To make matters worse, even the stated rates at
many of the FCS banks have become less com-
petitive. The average cost ofthe FCS debt has
remained high because of its high-yielding,
longer-term debt issued in the early 1980s. This,FRBSF
coupled with the FCS's practice of setting loan
rates on the basis of the average cost of funds,
rather than on the cost of newly issued
securities, as most other lenders do, has made
the System's loan rates less attractive.
Buying time
In an attempt to slow the departure ofhigher
qualityb6rrowers; the FCS has instituted a sys-
tem of loan rates that are more competitive with
those of banks and other lenders. First, the FCS '
is shifting away from average cost pricing. Sec-
ond, borrowers are divided into several tiers
depending on their credit standing. The highest
quality borrowers are offered the lowest rate of
the bottom tier while riskier borrowers are
offered higher rates in the upper tiers.
Although a flexible pricing structure will help
retain some members and have some long-run
benefits for the FCS, it does not address the
immediate problems of losses due to the high
average cost of funds and poor quality assets
and the resulting threat to member capital. In an
attempt to deal with these problems, the 1986
amendments to the Farm Credit Act permitted
the FCS to account for losses using Regulatory
Accounting Practices (RAP). Unlike Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles, which require
that losses be booked in the sameperiod that
they are realized, RAP allows the FCS to amor-
tize losses over a 20-year period. Such tech-
niques are designed to prevent the impairment
of member capital stock on an accounting basis
- that is, to keep the book value equal to the
par value. Unfortunately these accountingtech-
niques are cosmetic. They may buy time, but
they do not improve the underlying financial
condition of the FCS.
Treasury line of credit
The financial problems of the FCS require more
substantive solutions. The most often mentioned
possibility, and one supported by the FCA, is to
activate a line of credit for the FCS with the
Treasury. One potentially important weakness of
this option is the adverse effect it would have on
the federal budget deficit.
But budget issue aside, how would a line of
credit help the FCS? If Treasury assistance took
the form of a conventional line of credit, the one
tangible effect would be some reduction in the
interest costs of the FCS. As of early September
1987, rates on FCS debt were around 30 to 40
basis points over those of comparable Treasury
securities. Such a line of credit, however, would
not give the FCS a new way around the high
cost of its outstanding debt. If the FCS were to
use the Treasury funds to retire some of the high-
cost debt outstanding, the System would have to
pay a premium to retire that debt even at current
market interest rates. Also, a straight line of
credit would do nothing to reduce the losses
from exposure to problem loans.
What the FCS really could use is additional capi-
tal. Then, why is the FCA so interested in a line
of credit? The answer lies in the unusual terms
likely to be attached to the Treasury loans. Cur-
rent legislation being debated by the Congress
would allow the Treasury to make a long-term
loan to the FCS, which over part of its life would
be interest-free.
Such an interest-free loan is equivalent to a capi-
tal infusion. The effective size of that infusion is
equal to the present value ofthe interest pay-
ments foregone by the Treasury. The longer the
interest-free period, the larger the capital contri-
bution from the Treasury (taxpayers). For exam-
ple, the FCS is currently requesting a $6 billion
dollar line of credit. Assuming a full takedown of
the line of credit, an interest rate of 10 percent,
no repayment of principal for 5 years, and an
interest-free period of 5 years, the present value
of the transfer would be approximately $2 1 /4 bil-
lion. If the interest-free period were increased to
10 years, the transfer would increase to approx-
imately $3% billion.
Even though the effective capital infusion from
the Treasury could be quite substantial, it would
take time for it to be reflected fully on the bal-
ance sheets of FCS banks. This lag presents a
problem to those FCS banks and associations
that have fully depleted their earned surplus.
An FCS proposal embodied in Senate Bill S.1219
would allow Treasury assistance to make an
impact on the book value capital of the FCS
more quickly. The proposal would establish a
Federal Farm Credit Assistance Board that would
have the ability not only to lend to FCS banks
but also to make "capital" infusions into indi-
vidual banks. According to an FCS report, as
much as half ofthe $6 billion dollars being
requested would be needed to meet deficiencies
in surplus capital in eight of the twelve FCS Dis-
tricts. Such use of the Treasury borrowings
would allow the individual entities within the
FCS to maintain book-value capital above mem-ber contributions, untiI the favorable effects of
the interest free loans were reflected on the Sys-
tem's balance sheet.
Recapitalization?
The proposal to recapitalize the FCS with debt
has certain parallels with the plan enacted ear-
lier this year to provide additional funds to the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLlC). The legislation to recapitalize the FSLlC
authorizes a new federally sponsored agency
that would issue its own securities and pass the
funds on to the insurance fund as a capital
contribution.
A distinguishing feature of the plan for the
FSLlC, however, is that the interest on the debt
will be paid from the insurance fund's resources,
not from taxes. In particular, the interest on the
debt issued would be paid out of the insurance
premiums assessed the insured savings institu-
tions. The rationale for using debt to recapitalize
the FSLlC reflects the recognition that the FSLlC
has more resources - namely, the authority to
assess insurance premiums - to handle prob-
lem savings institutions than what is shown on
the insurance fund's current balance sheet. Frederick T. Furlong and John M. Nielsen
A similar situation does not hold for the FCS.
Moreover, it is likely that, on a true or market
value basis, the FCS is in worse shape than its
current balance sheet indicates. The FCA's own
outlook for the System supports this view. With-
out federal aid, the FCA projects that the Farm
Credit System as a whole would show net los?es
each year through at least 1994. It appears that
the Treasury line of credit to the FCS would
provide for interest-free loans, at least for some
period, because the FCS simply would not be
able to met both interest payments to the Treas-
ury and its obligations to other debtors, without
impairing member capital.
Conclusion
Heavy FCS losses and the depletion of its earned
surplus have left little or no buffer for member
capital at many FCS banks and associations. To
protect FCS member capital legislation has been
proposed that would give the System a line of
credit with the Treasury. Since a conventional
line of credit would be of little help, plans for
Treasury assistance currently being considered
by the Congress provide for interest-free loans.
For the FCS, such interest-free lending would
represent a needed infusion of capital, funded
by the taxpayers.
The size of the capital infusion ultimately
required by the FCS is uncertain. For example, if
the farm sector itself were to perform better over
the next few years than is currently expected, a
higher proportion of the FCS's problem loans
could be repaid. This would exert a favorable
effect on earned surplus and reduce the period
for which Treasury loans would have to be inter-
est-free. To limit the transfer of taxpayer funds to
the FCS to the minimum amount required, the
interest-free period initially should be relatively
short, should be reviewed periodically, and
extended based on the prospective financial
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 206,325 - 439 2,750 1.3
Loans and Leases1 6 182,383 - 543 - 1,229 - 0.6
Commercial and Industrial 51,148 333 1,072 2.1
Real estate 69,897 - 9 2,448 3.6
Loans to Individuals 37,096 - 13 - 4,276 - 10.3
Leases 5,401 16 - 265 - 4.6
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 17,001 100 5,240 44.5
Other Securities2 6,941 3 - 1,262 - 15.3
Total Deposits 202,413 - 4,713 - 1,741 - 0.8
Demand Deposits 49,077 - 3,893 - 1,414 - 2.8
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 34,530 - 1,282 - 11,784 - 25.4
OtherTransaction Balances4 19,456 - 754 2,454 14.4
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 133,880 - 65 - 2,781 - 2.0
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 44,373 - 320 - 1,969 - 4.2
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000ormore 31,158 208 - 3,482 - 10.0
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 26,603 - 757 - 305 - 1.1
Two WeekAverages
ofDaily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
5 Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
'6 Includes items not shown separately
7 Annualized percent change